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Joseph Diekemper 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to approach the question of God’s temporality via a study of the 
nature of events.  If events are necessarily extended entities involving change, then there is no 
such thing as a non-temporal event.  And if God is necessarily the subject of such events, 
then he is necessarily temporal.  In Section 1 I will defend the essentially temporality of 
events, and in Section 2 I will consider various ways of conceiving of divine events, 
concluding that these necessarily exist. 
1.0 The Ontology of Events 
In this section I will argue that we do not have good reason to allow instantaneous events into 
our ontology, and therefore that events should be conceived as essentially temporal and 
extended entities which involve change.
1   
  Why think that events cannot be instantaneous?  For the simple and common sense 
reason that events are, intuitively, processes of change.  Lombard (1986) has argued that 
events are processes of change; and it certainly is integral to the common sense concept of an 
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event—or ‘happening’—that it involve change.
2  But while common sense may be a good 
starting point in metaphysics, it can only take us so far.  Once we start applying a little 
metaphysical pressure to a common sense concept, we often find that the concept cannot hold 
up under the strain, and that it requires some revision.  So even if we normally conceive of 
events as processes of change, is this necessarily the case?  Leftow (2002) has argued that 
events need not be extended, and therefore that they need not involve change.  Clearly, 
change cannot occur at an instant, so if an event can occur at an instant, then events are not 
necessarily processes of change.  So Leftow applies some metaphysical pressure to the notion 
that events cannot be instantaneous, and concludes that this notion is mistaken.  This paves 
the way for him to argue that God can be the subject of an instantaneous, timeless event; and 
this, in turn, helps to provide a coherent conception of Boethius’ notion of the divine ‘eternal 
present’.  Leftow brings four main points to bear against the thesis that events cannot be 
instantaneous.  I will consider these in turn, and will conclude that the common sense 
conception of events as essentially temporally extended entities can hold up against the 
pressure Leftow applies to it. 
1.1 Instantaneous velocity 
First, Leftow considers the case of motion (Leftow, op. cit., p. 26).  We can take any 
instantaneous slice of a given motion (such as my walking from A to B) and claim that that 
slice is a temporal part of the event that is my walking from A to B.  There is, for example, an 
instant at which I am midway between A and B, and my being in that position at that instant 
is a part of my walking from A to B.  But, according to Leftow, a temporal part of an event 
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can only be an event itself.  Events only have events as temporal parts, and motions only have 
movings (which are events) as temporal parts.  Why think that my instantaneously being 
midway between A and B is a moving?  Because, according to Leftow, I have an 
instantaneous velocity at that point, and obviously only objects that move have velocity.  So 
the instantaneous slice of my motion is an instantaneous moving and is therefore an event. 
  But is there any reason to think that instantaneous velocity, which is introduced in a 
scientific context by special definition in terms of limits, is an actual velocity possessed by an 
object at an instant?  Suppose I reach the midway point between A and B at time t.  And 
suppose we measure my velocity over increasingly smaller and smaller intervals of time 
ending at t, and these measurements get closer and closer to 1 m/s.  Further, suppose that we 
measure my velocity over increasingly smaller and smaller intervals of time beginning at t; 
and suppose that these measurements also get closer and closer to 1 m/s.  This, according to 
definition, yields an instantaneous velocity of 1 m/s at time t.  But note that the definition is 
given in terms of intervals of time, and that it is over intervals of time that the velocity is 
actually measured.  Furthermore, notice that the definition treats the instant t not as 
containing an event, but as the bounding point of intervals over which velocity is measured.  
Although the definition is neutral with respect to the ontological status of events, it 
nonetheless treats instantaneous velocity as a purely theoretical concept derived from 
velocities measured over temporal intervals; thus the definition does not support the inference 
from an instantaneous velocity to an instantaneous moving.  Given how instantaneous 
velocities are defined, Swinburne (1994) argues that we should not think that they are 
somehow discovered with the use of limits; rather, according to Swinburne, an instantaneous 
velocity is just a limit of velocities measured over series of intervals—intervals which are 
bounded by the instant to which the instantaneous velocity is, by definition, attributed 
(Swinburne, op. cit., p. 73).   4 
 
  If this is correct, then there seems little reason to suppose that instants are temporal 
parts of events.  In fact, it seems wholly implausible that some contiguous set of instants of 
zero duration could somehow add up to an interval or event of non-zero duration.  If, 
however, instants are merely the bounding points of temporal intervals, then there is no 
pressure to admit instantaneous events into our ontology (other than, perhaps, as theoretical 
entities).
3   
1.2 Succeeding events 
So Swinburne endorses (what I am calling) the common sense view, according to which 
instants are merely the bounding points of temporal intervals, and things happen over 
temporal intervals, rather than at instants.  Leftow, however, puts further pressure on the 
common sense view by claiming that the instantaneous moving, which he takes to be part of a 
motion, can be thought of as the successful culmination of a process which leads up to being 
at that location.  And this, according to Leftow, ‘sounds like an event’ (Leftow, ibid.).  The 
thought is that, in ordinary language, we speak of reaching a particular place (such as my 
reaching the midway point between A and B), where the reaching implies succeeding; and, 
according to Leftow, a succeeding is an event.  Thus, a perfectly legitimate answer to the 
question, ‘what happened at t’ is, ‘I reached the midway point between A and B at t’.  So 
reaching there must be an instantaneous event which happened at t.   
  Leftow acknowledges that there is another way of describing the same situation: 
perhaps reaching there only refers to the event involving changes leading up to being there.  
But being there is not an event, it is a state ‘which terminates the events leading up to my 
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being there’ (ibid.).  So here we have two different ways of describing the same situation, one 
of which characterizes my location at t as an instantaneous event, and the other which 
characterizes it merely as the terminus of an event.  How shall we decide between these two 
characterizations?  It’s not clear that ordinary language is going to help us adjudicate in these 
kinds of ontological disputes.  If we took the ontological commitments of ordinary language 
at face value, we would have a far more bloated ontology than most of would be prepared to 
allow.  Yes, we can say things like, ‘it happened that I reached that point at that instant,’ 
without offending the ear.  But just as most of us would not want to allow the existence of a 
property for every predicate of language, we also should not affirm the existence of an event 
for every linguistically proper use of the verb ‘to happen’.  Events are concrete particulars 
which serve as the relata of causal relations, and are therefore more course grained than mere 
facts, which have a one to one correspondence with every true, linguistically correct 
description of reality (i.e. a different description corresponds to a different fact).  So just as 
one and the same event can admit of several different descriptions, without implying that 
more than one event is being referred to; so, too, not every true, linguistically correct 
description which sounds like an event is an event.
4  What we should ask ourselves is what 
our fundamental theory of the world commits us to; and while we should not avoid an 
abundant ontology as a matter of principle, we should endeavour to reduce our ontological 
commitments wherever doing so does not reduce the explanatory power of our theory.  Given 
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this desideratum, does the explanation of my reaching the midway point between A and B 
really require both the event of my travelling from A to the midpoint of AB, and the event of 
my arriving at the midpoint of AB (at t)?  Or does is it only require that the former event 
terminate at time t?  I submit that the ontological parsimony of the latter explanation is, for 
that reason, more virtuous.  
  There is a potential worry, however, with this line of argumentation.  I am claiming 
that my location at t is the terminus of an event involving my walking from A to the specified 
location, and as such does not constitute a distinct event.  Can we not, however, conceive of a 
possible world which consists only in my being at that location at t, and nothing else?  And if 
such a world is possible, then what should we say about the ontological status of that instant?  
If it is just the terminus of an event which, ex hypothesi, does not exist, then it appears that 
the instant also cannot exist.
5  But would I really wish to claim that the described world is not 
possible?  My answer is that there might be possible worlds in which objects admit of 
properties and relations which never change, but that there is no sense in which anything 
occurs in such worlds, and therefore no sense in which time exists in such worlds.
6  So if 
there is a world in which I am located at the midpoint between A and B, but in which nothing 
ever happens, then there are neither temporal instants nor events in that world (see Section 
1.4, below). 
1.3 Coming to be 
Leftow’s next point focuses on the notion of coming to be.  He argues that coming to be can 
only be a change if it is a change in the entity that comes to be; but, since the entity that 
comes to be does not exist until the instant at which the process of coming to be is complete, 
coming to be cannot be a change in the entity that comes to be.  Thus, coming to be is an 
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instantaneous event.  Suppose, for example, that x comes to be at t.  Prior to t, x does not 
exist; subsequent to t, x already exists.  So x’s coming to be is not a change in the individual 
x that comes to be.  Thus t cannot be conceived as the terminal instant of an extended event 
(i.e. x’s coming to be), since there is no subject of change prior to t.  Therefore coming to be 
is an instantaneous event, since t is the first instant of x’s existence. 
  My response to this argument is to claim that it conflates qualitative change with 
substantial change.  Obviously x’s coming to be is not a process of qualitative change, since x 
does not exist to undergo change during the process of its coming to be.  But clearly 
something is changing in the coming to be of a new individual.  For Aristotle, coming to be is 
a case of substantial change, since it involves the coming into existence of a substance that 
did not previously exist.  So what is the subject of change in a case of substantial change?  It 
is the matter of which x is formed.  If x is a member of the substantial kind K, then x’s 
coming to be is a change in the matter which eventually constitutes x—that change being the 
instantiation of the substantial kind K.  So x’s coming to be is not something which happens 
to x, but it is something which happens to x’s matter, and thus it is a temporally extended 
event involving change.  Of course, we could characterize x’s coming to be as a process 
involving substantial change, and at the same time characterize x’s coming to be (at t) as the 
successful completion of that process, and therefore as an instantaneous event.  Again, 
however, the latter is merely a linguistic characterization, and it is one that does no 
ontological work (given the argument in Section 1.2). 
  Leftow considers three examples in this context: one is the first moment of time, one 
is the coming to be of the universe according to Big Bang cosmology, and the third is the 
coming to be of Michelangelo’s David (ibid.: pp. 27-28).  Leftow takes all three examples to 
be of a par, and the notion of coming to be to be a perfectly general one.  However, given my 
response to his argument, it is not clear that I can treat all three examples as involving the 8 
 
same kind of event.  It is one thing to analyze David’s coming to be as a case of substantial 
change in David’s matter, it is another to analyze the first moment of time or the coming to 
be of the universe as a case of substantial change—substantial change in what?  Setting aside, 
for the moment, the example of the first moment of time, I will focus first on the example 
from Big Bang cosmology.  According to that cosmology (and according to the theological 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo), there is no matter prior to the existence of the universe, and 
therefore no potential subject of change.  This entails, according to Leftow, that the 
universe’s coming to be is not a change but an instantaneous event.  There are two ways to 
consider the metaphysics of this situation: one is atheologically, and the other theologically.   
  Atheologically, either the initial appearance of the singularity—from which the 
universe expanded—was a contingent, yet uncaused, cause, or it was an effect of some prior 
event (for example, the big crunch of an earlier universe).  Only on the former construal 
would it be true to say that the first moment of the universe was an instantaneous event; since 
on the latter construal, the appearance of the ‘original’ singularity is the terminus of an event 
whose origin is the big crunch of an earlier universe.  But how plausible is the former 
construal?  If the scientific explanation for any event or state is made by reference to its 
causal antecedents (a plausible assumption), then the existence of an original, contingent, yet 
uncaused, cause would entail the impossibility of explaining all that is causally downstream 
from the event.  This strikes me as a particularly unpalatable option for those engaged in 
atheological explanation, since it blocks a certain response to the cosmological argument.  
Proponents of that argument will claim that atheists are unable to ultimately explain 
existence.  In response, atheists will say it suffices for explanation to be able to explain any 
event in terms of earlier events—that is as ‘ultimate’ an explanation as is required.  Clearly, 
this response loses its force if there is a contingent, first cause.   9 
 
  Furthermore, although Leftow speaks in terms of the ‘appearance’ of the Big Bang 
singularity, and I have retained that language above for the sake of argument, it may 
misrepresent the actual Big Bang cosmological models.  Halvorson and Kragh (2011) claim 
that in the singular spacetime models which most closely model our universe, if t0 is the 
absolute lower bound of the time parameter t, then as t decreases towards t0, ‘t0 is an ideal 
point that is never reached: the universe exists at all times after t0, but not before or at time 
t0’.  Thus, on these models, there is no initial state of the singularity or first moment of time, 
even though the universe is finitely old; there is only a first interval of time.  This would 
entail that, from the atheological perspective, neither the Big Bang example nor the first 
moment of time example can do the work that Leftow intends them to.  In any event, given 
the context of Leftow’s argument, as one in which conceptual room is being made for the 
notion of a divine ‘eternal present’, atheological considerations are not, perhaps, terribly 
relevant. 
   Considering the metaphysics of the situation from the theological perspective, the 
appearance of the singularity is, once again, either an original singularity, or it is an effect of 
some earlier cosmic event (big crunch, etc).  In either case, however, God is the ultimate, 
necessary cause of whatever is the genuine original singularity (we are assuming, for the sake 
of the argument for instantaneous events, that there was such an entity).  One question here is 
how we should characterize the change—if, as I maintain, it is a change—involved in the first 
act of creation.  It cannot be substantial change in the Aristotelian sense, since there exists 
nothing material prior to the appearance of the original singularity.  Leftow considers and 
rejects the thought that the first act of creation would be a change in the ‘way things are’, and 
I think he is correct that this is too diffuse a notion to serve as the subject of change.  But 
what about God?  Before his first act of creation he has never created (trivially), so can’t his 
first act of creation be a (relational) change in him?  Well, this description of the first act of 10 
 
creation entails that God is temporal, and that is ultimately what is at stake here.  Similar 
worries about circularity attend the example of the first moment of time, since a first moment 
of time is only plausible on the assumption that God is atemporal: if God is necessarily 
eternal and temporal, and time is necessarily unified, then there could be no first moment of 
time.   
  The lesson here is, I think, that the examples of creation ex nihilo and the first 
moment of time (from the theological perspective) cannot be used to demonstrate either the 
possibility or impossibility of instantaneous events.  One must assume a conception of divine 
eternity in order to employ the examples in such a way, and the conclusions reached bear 
directly on the nature of divine eternity. 
1.4 Changeless instants 
In the final argument I wish to consider, Leftow takes the occurrence of an instant to be an 
instantaneous event which does not involve change.  He argues that the only way to deny this 
is to endorse the reduction of time to actual events and their relations.  According to Leftow, 
however, this reduction has the consequence that ‘nothing could have occurred at any time 
save what actually did occur then,’ and this is not plausible (ibid., p. 32).
7  I will argue that 
the reduction of time to actual events and their relations can avoid this alleged ramification, 
and thus that this should not be cited as a reason to reject the reduction.  And as Leftow 
acknowledges, if one were to reduce time in this manner, then one can reject the claim that 
changeless instants occur.
8   
  I will start my argument by acknowledging agreement with Leftow on his main point 
in this context.  He argues that the reduction of time to actual events and their relations 
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(henceforth ‘TR’ (Temporal Reductionism)) entails essentialism about times.  If times are 
nothing more than simultaneous sets of events then the events simultaneous with any given 
time t are essential to t.  Thus t does not exist in worlds in which the set of events which 
actually comprise t does not exist.  So, suppose in the actual world @ that I drive to 
Donaghadee at t.  Now suppose that in some other, very close possible world w, I instead 
drive to Bangor, where my driving to Bangor is simultaneous with all the events in w that my 
driving to Donaghadee is simultaneous with in @.  Since my driving to Donaghadee at t is an 
essential constituent of t, t does not exist in w, and so it is not true in w that I drive to Bangor 
at t.  So I agree with Leftow that this essentialism about times cannot allow for alternative 
possibilities to obtain at times that are transworld identical. 
But shouldn’t our metaphysics allow for this?  Well, certainly our metaphysics should 
allow for claims such as, ‘I might have driven to Bangor at t,’ and the question is whether 
essentialism about times can allow for that claim without transworld identity for times.  I 
think it can by employing the concept of a counterpart.
9  A modal counterpart to an actual 
individual is an individual existing in some other possible world which bears a relation of 
similarity to the actual individual.  The closer the world, the closer the relation of similarity.  
The modal counterpart in w of actual time t is the time at which I drive to Bangor instead of 
driving to Donaghadee (call it t
w).  So the claim, ‘I might have driven to Bangor at t’ is true in 
virtue of my driving to Bangor in w at t
w; and I think that this is all that is required to allow 
that things might have gone differently.  So although alternative possibilities cannot obtain at 
(strictly) identical times, they can obtain at times that are otherwise identical to actual times 
(otherwise but for the non-occurence of the event actually occurring at that time).  Finally, it 
is important to stress that this account of counterpart times need not buy into the counterpart 
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theory of modal realism.  If one endorses transworld identity for other kinds of individuals, 
and rejects modal realism and the indexicality of actuality, then one may continue to do so 
while acknowledging that there are counterparts to actual times. 
  What we have seen in this section is that the common sense view that events are 
processes of change can withstand the sustained metaphysical pressure that Leftow brings to 
bear on it.  And if events are processes of change, then they are temporally extended entities; 
that is, there are no non-temporal events.  Assuming that one accepts the common sense 
status I have accorded the thesis that events are processes of change, then this section 
provides considerable evidence in favour of the thesis. 
2.0 Divine Events 
Given the conclusion of Section 1, if God is a subject of events, then God is temporal.
10  In 
other words, if divine events exist, then God is in time.  There are several concerns associated 
with the concept of a divine event, but most of these stem from the worry that God can only 
be the subject of an event in virtue of his interaction with creation, since it would be 
inappropriate and overly anthropomorphic to characterize God's mental life as involving 
discrete, ordered events.  Furthermore, the objector will note that even if we assume God's 
mental life to involve events, and take this to imply that God is temporal, then we must say 
that God waited an infinite amount of time before creation (since a temporal God's life 
extends an infinite amount of time into the past).  Absent some principled reason for why 
God would wait an infinite amount of time to create, the objector concludes that it is absurd, 
and that we should therefore reject the initial assumption. I will consider three different 
responses to this set of concerns: the possibility of coeternal creation; the possibility of 
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changeless time prior to creation; and the possibility that reflection on God’s nature as a 
person can answer the objections. 
2.1 Coeternal creation 
According to the standard theistic view, God is the creator, but suppose that his being 
creative is not an accidental property; i.e., suppose that he is essentially creative.  Perhaps, 
then, he would not await an infinite amount of time to create.  The objector argues from the 
absurdity of God waiting an infinite amount of time to create to the conclusion that he must 
be timeless.  But if God is temporal, and he does not have a principled reason for delaying 
creation, then surely it is possible that he did not delay; that is, he must always have been 
creating.   Clearly, if we take the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and Big Bang cosmology 
seriously, with their implications of a finitely old universe, then our universe cannot be 
coeternal with God.
11  But this hardly rules out coeternal creation, since God’s creative 
activities could go well beyond our own universe.  If God is temporal, presumably he created 
the heavenly places and its denizens (e.g. angels) before he created our universe.  But if his 
creative activities are to fill an infinite past, then there must surely have been more than this.  
For this reason, the doctrine of coeternal creation seems to imply the existence of a 
multiverse: God has been creating other universes for an infinite amount of time.  If coeternal 
creation can be made sense of, then one could claim both that God is the subject of temporal 
events (in virtue of his interaction with his creation), and that there is no puzzle about why he 
waited to created.  There are, however, some potential pitfalls to this approach. For one thing, 
there is a concern about whether a temporal God's ontological priority can be confirmed 
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unless he also has temporal priority over his creation. Secondly, if God has always been 
creating, then perhaps there are an infinite number of universes among the multiverse, and 
this seems problematic. I will consider these two problems in turn. 
  First, I suppose the defender of coeternal creation would urge us to get away from 
thinking, ‘first God existed, then he created,’ in order to affirm his ontological priority over 
creation. It’s not as though God came into existence, then decided to create, he has always 
been existing, so (perhaps) he has always been creating.  Augustine attributes the doctrine of 
coeternal creation to the Platonists, though the context there is different, since they are 
defending the view that the human soul is coeternal with God (City of God, bk. 10, ch. 31).
12  
But Augustine provides them with a helpful analogy: a foot eternally planted in the dust.  
There is no temporal priority of the foot and the footprint if they are coeternal, but there 
seems to be no question that the print was formed by the pressure of the foot: without the 
foot, there could not have been a print.  In this way, the creation might ontologically depend 
upon God, even though some of the creation is coeternal with God (again, even if not our 
universe, then some universes, and presumably angels).  Furthermore, the Thomistic doctrine 
of creatio continuans could be employed here to help preserve God’s ontological priority 
over a coeternal creation.  According to this doctrine, God’s causing things to exist is a matter 
of him continually sustaining them wholly by his power.  If that power were removed by 
God, then the creation would cease to exist.  This seems to imply that the causal relation 
between God and his creation is primarily metaphysical and not temporally ordered from 
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earlier than to later than, in which case, God does not require temporal priority over his 
creation in order to have ontological priority.
13   
  The second worry, however, seems more problematic.  If God has been creating for 
an infinite amount of time, then this implies that his creation is infinitely old.  Since we have 
good reason to believe that our universe is not infinitely old, and since, as I argued above, 
coeternal creation implies the existence of a multiverse (again, assuming that our universe is 
not infinitely old), it also implies that there are an infinite number of universes in the 
multiverse.  The existence of a multiverse is difficult enough for many theists to embrace, but 
even those who do, argue that the justification for such ontological extravagance is that it can 
help explain how the creation as a whole is the unique best possible world (i.e. the universe 
good making properties in all the universes, taken together, maximally outweigh the bad 
making properties of our universe).
14  But if the multiverse is the unique, best possible world, 
then it appears that it cannot be infinite, since I take it that an infinite number of entities 
cannot be unique.  So this gives us little independent reason for embracing such an 
extravagant ontology as an infinitely large multiverse. 
2.2 Changeless time prior to creation 
The second possibility is due to Swinburne (1994). He argues for the possibility that God, 
prior to creation, was the subject of a single, undifferentiated event—perhaps a mental act 
of self-awareness. According to Swinburne, during this pre-creation temporal interval there 
would be no metric of time.  This is because a metric of time is contingent and dependent 
upon natural laws, inasmuch as measurement of temporal intervals requires the regularity of 
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law governed physical processes.  For Swinburne, this means that the occurrence of events is 
sufficient for the existence, and ordering relations, of time; but for there to be a fact of the 
matter about the measurement of those relations, there must also exist laws of nature.  Thus 
Swinburne argues that as long as God’s pre-creation mental act of self-awareness did not 
involve any change throughout its duration, there would be no fact of the matter about 
whether the event lasted an instant or an infinite amount of time. So, we can have time before 
creation, without any absurdity associated with how long God waited to create.   
  How can there be time with no succession of events, and no change throughout the 
event in question? For Swinburne, the interval during which the act of self awareness takes 
place is still a temporal one, because it is possible throughout that interval that some change 
take place. That is to say, Swinburne endorses the modal reduction of time, according to 
which time is reduced to relations between actual and possible events (as opposed to relations 
only between actual events). I think this solution is problematic for two reasons. In the first 
place, I reject the modal reduction, so on my ontology there can be no time 'during' the act of 
self awareness.
15  This means that if I wish to avail myself of Swinburne’s answer, I must 
affirm that time did not start ‘until’ the first moment of creation. This view, which is as 
difficult to articulate as it is to believe, is the one adopted by Craig (2001).  It is an odd view, 
and considered problematic by many. Consider, on this view, that there is no 'before' God has 
created, since before is a temporal relation and, on this view, God is timeless without 
creation. The view also renders God’s temporality an accidental feature of his existence (if 
we assume that he need not have created).  
  But even if I were to endorse the modal reduction of time to which Swinburne 
subscribes, and so avoid Craig’s ‘timeless sans creation’ conception of divine eternity, there 
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would still be a problem: I do not think that the act of self awareness by God which 
Swinburne considers is possible.  To see why, we need to look at a third possible response to 
the concerns attending divine events before creation. This is the response that I favour.  
2.3 The personhood of God  
This response claims that God’s essential personhood requires that his thoughts are dynamic, 
ordered events.  According to this response, the best way to interpret the concept of the 
Imago Dei ('image of God'), in which the Bible claims human beings are made, is in terms of 
personhood.
16  It is therefore the category of personhood that we have in common with God.  
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe, on this conception, that the category of 
personhood is essentially relational.  Emil Brunner (1952) argues that the Imago Dei is not 
some intrinsic property which we have independently of our relation to God, rather, it entails 
a responsive relationship to God.  According to Brunner, inasmuch as God reveals himself to 
us through Christ, Christ is the centre from which we must consider the concept of the image 
of God.  What is this revelation?  It is the revelation of ‘the One who imparts Himself to me 
in freedom, since as Holy Love He claims me wholly for Himself’ (Brunner 1952, p. 55).  
Furthermore, since Christ reveals himself to us in this way, his revelation of himself also 
provides us with a revelation of ourselves: ‘He is the One who wills to have from me a free 
response to His love, a response which gives back love for love...’ (ibid.).  So as Christ 
reveals himself to me, I learn something about myself: I am designed to freely be in a loving 
relationship with him.  According to Brunner, once we realize the intimate connection 
between knowing God through Christ and being known by him, we cannot but conclude that 
to be in relation to him is part of our nature. 
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  Thus, in creating human beings in his image, God has made us to reflect his freely 
given love by freely responding to him in love.  In being made in God’s image or likeness, of 
course, our freedom is not just like God’s; his freedom is unlimited, whereas ours is limited.  
Indeed, given that we are made to respond in love to God, we have a responsibility to do so, 
and as Brunner points out, responsibility involves a restricted freedom: it entails that we must 
be free to choose to respond (since we do not hold creatures who lack freedom responsible), 
but it also entails that we must respond appropriately in order to fulfil our responsibility.  I 
say respond ‘appropriately,’ since Brunner takes it that every human being makes some 
response to the relational nature of her existence, even if she does not recognize it as such—
the unbeliever responds to the call by turning away from God.  So the responsibility to freely 
respond in love to God is part of the nature and existence of every human being.  Brunner 
says of this responsibility that it ‘is part of the unchangeable structure of man’s being...he has 
been made to respond—to God’ (ibid., p. 57). 
  When this Christ centered conception of the image of God is characterized in terms of 
personhood, it entails that the personhood of both God and human beings is fundamentally 
relational and loving, and of course this is supported by the apostle John’s assertion that ‘God 
is love’ (1 John 4:8, my emphasis).  In view of this conception of God’s personhood, we have 
much more in common with God than the classical conception allows.  The classical 
conception claims that God is simple, impassible, and strongly immutable; the relational 
conception of the image of God entails that he changes in his relations with created persons 
and is, to some extent, affected by those relations; and, of course, all of this entails that he is 
not simple.  So on the relational conception, concerns about excessive anthropomorphism are 
often exaggerated and misplaced.  We unacceptably anthropomorphize God only when we 
project our finite attributes onto him.  It is the infinity of his attributes which distinguishes 
God from human beings, not the generic attributes themselves. So, plausibly, God and human 19 
 
beings share not only love, but also such attributes as creativity, intentionality, imagination, 
rationality, knowledge, power, goodness, etc, but where God's capacities in realizing these 
attributes are unlimited, ours are limited.  
  Once we are freed from worries about anthropomorphism, then we are able to take at 
face value the depiction of God in the Bible, where such mental states as love, anger, 
pleasure, sorrow, regret, and jealousy are attributed to God.  So we should consider what 
God’s mental life would need to be like in order to experience these mental states.
17  If God’s 
mental life did not consist of discrete, ordered events, then all of his experiences would be 
accessible at every time.  So, at any given time t, he might be experiencing love for a humble 
servant, sadness for a lost soul, anger at someone who had led believers astray, and pleasure 
in a particular creative plan of his (and of course, an infinite amount of other experiences).  
What sense can be made of the claim that any person, whether they are infinite or not, can 
have all of these experiences simultaneously?  One begins to feel that what we must be 
dealing with here is not a person, but merely an infinite knower.  We can make sense of an 
infinite being knowing everything at every time, but I would reject that any sense can be 
made of any being experiencing all of their intentional, emotional states at every time.  And 
for those of us who believe in a personal God—the God of the Bible—it seems essential that 
we attribute such experiences to God. 
  If this is correct, it implies that God experiences emotions in a way that is structurally 
similar to ours; and this entails that God's mental life does not just consist of static, 
propositional attitude states, but necessarily involves the dynamic experience of events. 
Furthermore, as implied by the arguments of Leftow (1991), in which he posits the pleasure 
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of anticipation experienced by God prior to creation (as an explanation of why God did not 
create sooner), these emotional experiences need not depend upon God's already having 
created.  We have every reason to believe that God’s inner mental life would be wonderfully 
rich even prior to interacting with his creation.  Think of God’s experiences prior to creation 
by analogy with an author who savours the working out of his story.  God’s being omniscient 
does not make this analogy incoherent, it just means that, unlike a human author, he does not 
need to work it out.  This, however, does not entail that he does not enjoy working it out.  
And working it out requires thought processes that consist in ordered mental events. 
  This analogy with an author suggests another way of interpreting the doctrine of 
coeternal creation.  If we agree with the advocate of coeternal creation that God is essentially 
creative and has always been exercising his creative power, and if we think that God’s inner 
mental life is far richer than Swinburne’s example of an undifferentiated act of self-
awareness would suggest, then there is scope to claim that, prior to the creation of the 
universe, God’s creative power was exercised in his inner mental life.  Consider how much 
pleasure we, as persons, derive from the exercise of our creative imagination; and then 
consider how much more the pleasure for God must be in such an exercise.  It is true, for 
human beings the creative process can also often be both excruciating and cathartic, and these 
aspects of the process would clearly not apply in God’s case; but it is plausible that the 
pleasurable aspect of the creative process would apply in God’s case.  On this rendering of 
coeternal creation, according to which it is the exercise of his creative power in his inner 
mental life that is coeternal with God, there are no worries about ontological priority or 
infinite universes; but there are also no worries about why God waited to create, because he 
did not wait. 
Conclusion 21 
 
In Section 2 I have offered some ways of thinking about God’s mental life which, if correct, 
entail that he is necessarily the subject of events both prior and subsequent to creation.  It is 
God’s shared personhood with ourselves that allows us to conceive of God’s mental life in 
this way. If the essential temporality of events defended in Section 1 is also correct, then God 
is necessarily temporal. 
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